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In In re JR38, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a 14 year-old boy 
who argued that the dissemination of his image, taken whilst he was participating in sectarian 
rioting, to local newspapers, violated his rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). However, the Court was divided on whether or not the measures taken 
by the police engaged the applicant’s Article 8(1) rights at all. This case raises fundamental 
questions as to the scope of the private life in the context of criminal investigations, and the 
place of the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ 
test in determining whether Article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged. This case comment subjects 
the majority’s interpretation of Article 8(1) to critical scrutiny, concluding that this 
interpretation may unduly restrict the scope of Article 8 protection for those subject to criminal 
investigations.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Does the dissemination of a suspected offender’s image interfere with the enjoyment of his or 
her right to respect for private life under Article 8(1) of the ECHR? What if the suspected 
offender in question is a minor and the images are taken whilst he participates in a public riot? 
These issues were considered in the case of In re JR38,1 where the Supreme Court unanimously 
dismissed an appeal from a 14 year-old boy (referred to as “JR38”). The applicant had argued 
that the dissemination of his image to local newspapers, taken by the police whilst he was 
participating in sectarian rioting, violated his rights under Article 8 of the ECHR. However, 
the Court was divided in its reasoning for dismissing the appeal. The majority (Lord Toulson, 
with whom Lord Clarke and Lord Hodge agreed) held that the measures taken by the police 
did not interfere with the applicant’s Article 8(1) rights and, therefore, did not violate Article 
8 of the ECHR. On the other hand, the minority (consisting of Lord Kerr, with whom Lord 
Wilson agreed) observed that, whilst the dissemination of the applicant’s image in this case did 
engage Article 8, this interference could be justified as necessary to prevent and detect crime.  
 
The significant point of divergence between the judgment of Lord Toulson and the dissent of 
Lord Kerr is what each attributes to the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test set forth in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.2 Lord Toulson subscribes to the view, set out by Laws LJ in R 
(Wood) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis,3 that the individual’s ‘reasonable 
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expectation of privacy’ is the touchstone of Article 8(1), and without such an expectation 
Article 8 is not applicable. In finding the applicant’s Article 8(1) rights had been engaged, Lord 
Kerr argued that the ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test was not a ‘touchstone’ test of 
Article 8(1) and the extent to which an individual can be said to hold a reasonable expectation 
of privacy is just one factor to be taken into account when determining if Article 8 is engaged 
by the police use of a measure which may set back privacy interests. This case comment 
surveys the merits and limitations of each interpretation of Article 8(1) in terms of their 
cogency, and the respective implications each might have for the privacy interests of those 
subject to the criminal justice process. Drawing on scholarly literature and principles from the 
case law regarding the scope and value of privacy interests, this note concludes that the 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test, as used by the majority in In re JR38, unduly restricts 
the scope of Article 8 protection. 
 
The road to the Supreme Court 
 
On 23 and 26 July 2010 two newspapers, the Derry News and the Derry Journal, published, at 
the request of the police, images of JR38 along with others who were suspected of being 
involved in public disorder in Derry.4 The publication of these photographs was part of a police 
campaign known as ‘Operation Exposure’, which was designed to counteract sectarian rioting 
at ‘interface areas’ in parts of Derry.5 JR38 argued the publication of photographs of him in 
this context violated his rights under Article 8 of the ECHR. Article 8 is a qualified fundamental 
human right, meaning it may justifiably be interfered with by state authorities in certain 
circumstances:  
 
Article 8 – right to respect for private and family life 
1 Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his 
correspondence. 
2 There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such 
as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention 
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights 
and freedoms of others. 
 
On 21 March 2013, the Divisional Court of the Queen’s Bench Division in Northern Ireland 
dismissed JR38’s application for judicial review.6 Unlike the Supreme Court, the majority in 
the Divisional Court held Article 8(1) was engaged by the dissemination of the images.7 In 
finding there had been an interference with Article 8, Sir Declan Morgan LCJ took into 
consideration the applicant’s age; the fact that, at the time of publication, it had not been 
established that the applicant had participated in any offence; the risk of the applicant becoming 
stigmatised as a result of the publication of the images; and the detrimental effect the 
publication may have on the applicant’s subsequent rehabilitation.8 
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The case of In Re JR38 
 
The majority decisions: there was no interference with Article 8(1)  
Lord Toulson relied on the analysis of Laws LJ in R (Wood) v Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis,9 which sets forth three qualifications for establishing whether Article 8 is engaged:  
 
First, the alleged threat or assault to the individual’s autonomy must (if Article 8 is to be 
engaged) attain ‘a certain level of seriousness’. Secondly, the touchstone for Article 8(1)’s 
engagement is whether the claimant enjoys on the facts a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ 
(in any senses of privacy accepted in the cases). Absent such an expectation, there is no 
relevant interference with personal autonomy. Thirdly, the breadth of Article 8(1) may in 
many instances be greatly curtailed by the scope of the justifications available to the state 
pursuant to Article 8(2).10 
 
Lord Toulson observed that the second of Laws LJ’s qualifications identified the ‘touchstone’ 
of Article 8(1) as being whether the applicant in a particular case enjoyed on the facts a 
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ or ‘legitimate expectation of protection’ (which were taken 
to be synonymous).11 In support of this argument, both Lord Toulson and Laws LJ relied on 
the judgment of the ECtHR in Von Hannover v Germany12 and a number of other domestic 
cases.13 Lord Toulson also noted the differences in the facts in Sciacca v Italy,14 a case in which 
the ECtHR found an interference with Article 8(1) where the authorities published a 
photograph of the applicant following her involvement in a criminal process, and the JR38 
case. In the former case, Lord Toulson suggested the applicant had a legitimate expectation 
that the police would not disclose to the press a photo of her taken while she was under arrest, 
but that it was a very different question whether a member of a crowd engaged in a violent 
disturbance in a public space has a legitimate expectation of privacy.15 Thus, Lord Toulson 
ruled the nature of the activity the applicant was involved in fell outside the scope of Article 8 
protection.16 While Lord Toulson accepted the fact that the applicant was a child was a 
potentially relevant factor in the application of the reasonable expectation of privacy test, this 
was not sufficient reason for departing from the test altogether.17 Accordingly, the applicant’s 
rights under Article 8(1) were not engaged. 
 
Lord Clarke concurred with Lord Toulson’s interpretation insofar as he held the applicant had 
no objectively reasonable expectation that the police would not publish his photograph under 
the circumstances.18 However, Lord Clarke suggested that there might be circumstances where 
the publication of photographs of an individual in the course of criminal activity might engage 
his or her Article 8 rights if, for instance, the photographs were published for a purpose other 
than identification.19 
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 The minority judgment: the publication interfered with the applicant’s Article 8(1) rights 
The core of Lord Kerr’s dissent can be summarised in the following extract from his judgment:  
 
The engagement of the [Article 8] right, as opposed to justification of interference with it, 
must, of necessity, cover a wide field of an individual’s activity. And the potential scope of 
application of the provision must vary according not only to the conditions in which it is 
invoked, but also to the circumstances of the individual concerned.20 
 
Lord Kerr viewed the judgment of the ECtHR in PG and JH v United Kingdom,21 that ‘a 
person’s reasonable expectations as to privacy may be a significant, although not necessarily 
conclusive, factor’22 as important in determining the applicability of Article 8. Thus, Lord Kerr 
suggested that, although JR38 was engaged in public disorder at the time the police 
photographed him, what is reasonable to expect in terms of privacy protection is just one factor 
to be taken account in deciding whether Article 8(1) is interfered with through the subsequent 
publication of the photographs.23 Furthermore, Lord Kerr cited the case of Sciacca v Italy24 as 
significant in making an ‘unqualified statement of principle that the publication of a photograph 
falls within the scope of a private life.’25 However, as Lord Kerr noted, the facts in Sciacca and 
JR38 could be distinguished, as the photographs of the applicant in the former case were not 
taken as she was engaged in criminal activity in public space. 
 
Lord Kerr noted the publication of the photographs ran counter to the applicant’s best interests, 
and could have a stigmatising effect.26 Disputing the majority’s interpretation, that the 
reasonable expectation of privacy is the touchstone of Article 8(1), Lord Kerr observed the test 
for whether Article 8 is engaged is a contextual one involving an examination of a number of 
factors.27 Furthermore, Lord Kerr suggested that the ECtHR’s ruling in Von Hannover v 
Germany28 is not authority for elevating the reasonable expectation of privacy test to an 
inviolable position simply because it determined the applicant in that case had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.29 Lord Kerr also questioned the extent to which Laws LJ’s opinion in 
R (Wood) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis is supported in the cases of Campbell v 
MGN Ltd30 and Murray v Express Newspapers plc.31 Referring to the majority judgments, Lord 
Kerr states:  
 
[I]t is suggested that considerations such as the age of the child, the circumstances in which 
the avowed interference took place, the purpose of the publication of photographs and 
whether consent had been obtained are relevant only in so far as they may be said to conduce 
to the overarching “touchstone” of a reasonable expectation of privacy. The reason for 
adopting such an approach is not explained other than by reference to earlier authority, 
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C 
which, in turn, does not contain any analysis of why reasonable expectation of privacy 
should be given such unique and overweening status.32 
 
Finally, Lord Kerr drew attention to the fact Laws LJ’s judgment relies on Strasbourg decisions 
prior to S v United Kingdom, which did not apply a reasonable expectation of privacy 
test.33Accordingly, Lord Kerr suggested the primary focus should be on the setbacks caused by 
the publication of the photographs and not on the applicant’s expectations of privacy.  
 
Regarding justification under Article 8(2), Lord Kerr first concluded that, as the dissemination 
of the applicant’s image was plainly necessary for the administration of justice, the interference 
was both ‘in accordance with the law’ and in pursuit of a legitimate aim for the purposes of 
Article 8(2). The final requirement, that the interference must be ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’, boiled down to an analysis of whether the measures were proportionate. Applying the 
four-limbed proportionality test set forth in Bank Mellat v HM Treasury,34 Lord Kerr concluded 
that, as the publication of the photographs was a measure of last resort which had 
‘unquestionable and considerable’ benefits to the community, and because the applicant stood 
to gain by the opportunities afforded to him to be diverted from the criminal activity in which 
he had been engaged, it was a proportionate interference with the applicant’s Article 8 rights.35  
 
The Strasbourg position 
 
The ECtHR has consistently held that the right to respect for ‘private life’ includes ‘the physical 
and psychological integrity of a person’36 and the collection and dissemination of personally 
identified or identifiable data.37 The Strasbourg Court ‘considers that the notion of personal 
autonomy is an important principle underlying the interpretation of Article 8’s guarantees.’38 
As an individual’s image contains personal information about him or her (e.g. information 
about his or her visually observable physical characteristics which are personally identifiable), 
and can provide third parties with the capacity to observe and identify the individual, the 
dissemination of such an image will, prima facie, fall within the scope of Article 8(1).39 This 
point is articulated in the judgment of Reklos v Greece,40 where the ECtHR ruled:  
 
A person’s image constitutes one of the chief attributes of his or her personality, as it reveals 
the person’s unique characteristics and distinguishes the person from his or her peers. The 
right to the protection of one’s image is thus one of the essential components of personal 
development and presupposes the right to control the use of that image.41 
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 The view that the dissemination of an individual’s image can set back their privacy related 
interests is well-supported in academic scholarship.42 The Court has also concluded that there 
is a ‘zone of interaction with others, even in a public context, which may fall within the scope 
of “private life”’.43 The ECtHR recognises that setbacks to the individual’s privacy related 
interests can occur as the individual occupies public space. In PG and JH v United Kingdom,44 
the ECtHR held that where a public authority creates a systematic and permanent record of 
material collected from the public domain, such as an impression of an individual’s image 
taken from a closed circuit television (CCTV) camera monitoring a public area, this can fall 
within the scope of an individual’s private life.45 However, in the context of criminal 
investigations, the Court’s jurisprudence is less certain. On the one hand, in Friedl v Austria,46 
the (now disbanded) European Commission on Human Rights (ECommHR) held the taking 
and retention of photographs of the applicant by police as he participated in a public 
demonstration did not interfere with his Article 8 rights.47 The ECommHR noted the following 
elements: (i) there was no intrusion into the ‘inner circle’ of the applicant’s private life (i.e. the 
authorities did not enter any predesignated private domain of the applicant, such as his home); 
(ii) the photographs related to a public incident in which the applicant was taking part; and (iii) 
the photographs were taken for the purpose of recording the manifestation of the public 
demonstration and the authorities made no attempts to identify the applicant through data 
processing or any other means.48 Whilst the first two criteria suggest the collection and use of 
a suspect’s photograph as they occupy public space would not interfere with Article 8(1), the 
third element suggests this might not be the case where a public authority disseminates such 
images. Furthermore, in Lupker v Netherlands49 and Doorson v Netherlands,50 the ECommHR 
determined that public authorities could use photographs provided as part of an arrest or driving 
licence application for the purpose of identification because these photographs were not taken 
using intrusive methods, and because they had not been made available to the general public.51  
 
The above decisions may indicate the Commission’s inclination against finding an interference 
where an applicant’s image is collected from public space and subsequently disseminated as 
part of a criminal process. However, subsequent decisions of the ECtHR seem to support the 
notion that such dissemination will engage Article 8(1). In Peck v United Kingdom,52 where 
the CCTV footage of the aftermath of the applicant’s suicide attempt was disclosed to, and 
subsequently published by, a number of media outlets, the Court held that an interference had 
occurred because: ‘[t]he relevant moment was viewed to an extent which far exceeded any 
exposure to a passer-by or to security observation and to a degree surpassing that which the 
applicant could possibly have foreseen when he walked in Brentwood on August 20, 1995.’53 
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3, 4; D. Solove, Understanding Privacy (London: Harvard University Press, 2008) 136-160; B. von Silva-Tarouca 
Larsen, Setting the Watch: Privacy and the Ethics of CCTV Surveillance (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) 16-29; 
A. Marmor, ‘What Is the Right to Privacy?’ (2015) 43 Philos Public Aff 3. 
43 See n 21 above at [56].  
44 ibid.  
45 ibid at [57]. 
46 (1996) 21 EHRR 83. 
47 ibid at [51]. 
48 ibid at [49]. 
49 Lupker v Netherlands ECommHR 7 Dec 1992. 
50 Doorson v Netherlands EcommHR 29 Nov 1993. 
51 Lupker v Netherlands n 49 above, 5; Doorson v Netherlands n 50 above, 2. 
52 Peck v United Kingdom (2003) 36 EHRR 41 at [41]. 
53 ibid at [62].  
The Court also considered other factors, such as the fact that the applicant was in a distressed 
state at the time the footage was recorded. The judgment suggests that, where images taken 
from public space are disseminated beyond what on any objective test the applicant might have 
foreseen, this may engage Article 8.  
 
Additionally, in Perry v United Kingdom,54 the ECtHR held the publication of CCTV footage 
of the applicant in a degree beyond that normally foreseeable may also engage Article 8(1).55 
In Sciacca v Italy,56 the ECtHR found an interference with Article 8(1) had occurred where a 
photograph of the applicant was published in several newspapers whilst she was under 
investigation for (and subsequently convicted of) criminal association, tax evasion, and 
forgery.57 In this judgment, the Court reiterated that Article 8(1) may be engaged where the 
alleged interference takes place in a public context, adding that the fact that the applicant was 
the subject of criminal proceedings cannot curtail the scope of Article 8.58 This suggests that 
the scope of the individual’s private life is not diminished by the fact that they are, for whatever 
reason, the subject of a criminal investigation.  
 
Whilst there are distinctions to be made between the facts in all of the above cases and In re 
JR38, recent decisions of the ECtHR preponderantly favour finding an interference with Article 
8(1) where images of an individual are disseminated to the public, notwithstanding that the 
images were collected from public space, and regardless of whether the individual was subject 
to a criminal process.  
 
Discussion 
 
It is difficult to reconcile Lord Toulson’s interpretation with the jurisprudence of the ECtHR. 
That the existence of a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ is not the conclusive factor in 
determining the scope of the private life is stated in PG and JH v United Kingdom:  
 
There are a number of elements relevant to a consideration of whether a person’s private 
life may be concerned by measures effected outside a person’s home or private premises. 
Since there are occasions when people knowingly or intentionally involve themselves in 
activities which are or may be recorded or reported  in a public manner, a person’s 
reasonable expectations as to privacy may be a significant, although not necessarily 
conclusive, factor.59 
 
Lord Toulson viewed this passage as obscure and underdeveloped. He also observed that, in 
any case, this pre-dated the Von Hannover judgment, which clarifies the status of the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test.60 Whilst it might have been helpful for the ECtHR to 
provide more guidance on the role of reasonable expectations, and how and when that test 
should be applied, any suggestion that the italicised sentence can be interpreted to imply that 
the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is necessarily the conclusive factor in 
determining the scope of the private life seems inconsistent. Lord Toulson expresses his 
difficulty in reading the ECtHR jurisprudence as suggesting a situation may come within the 
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55 ibid at [38]. 
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58 ibid at [29]. 
59 n 21 above at [57] (emphasis added).  
60 n 1 above at [93]. 
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scope of Article 8 even where the person concerned had no reasonable expectation of privacy. 
However, later in the PG and JH judgment the ECtHR suggests an example of where this might 
be the case: ‘[a] person who walks down the street will, inevitably, be visible to any member 
of the public who is also present. … Private life considerations may arise, however, once any 
systematic or permanent record comes into existence of such material from the public 
domain.’61  
 
In this passage, the ECtHR recognises that restricting privacy protection to only those instances 
where an individual can reasonably expect privacy unduly narrows the scope of the right to 
respect for private life. Such a standard has no substantive criteria to establish what Contracting 
States should recognise as a part of the individual’s private life. As Solove highlights, the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test ‘provides only a status report on existing privacy norms 
rather than guides us toward shaping privacy law and policy in the future.’62 Indeed, as most 
British city centres are increasingly populated with public CCTV cameras it is becoming ever-
more unrealistic for individuals to reasonably expect that, as they occupy public space, their 
movements will not be monitored or even recorded via CCTV. Whilst this proliferation might 
alter the extent to which an individual can reasonably expect privacy as they occupy public 
space, it does not mean that such a proliferation is innocuous for privacy interests. Thus it is 
important to look beyond what expectations are currently considered reasonable, and towards 
what the scope of the protection should be when assessing an interference with Article 8(1).  
 
PG and JH does pre-date the Von Hannover judgment, however, Lord Kerr’s assessment that 
the Von Hannover judgment is not authority for giving the reasonable expectation of privacy 
the privileged status of a ‘touchstone’ test for the engagement of Article 8(1) is worth 
consideration. The relevant passage in Von Hannover states:  
 
The court [ECtHR] has also indicated that, in certain circumstances, a person has a 
‘legitimate expectation’ of protection and respect for his private life. Accordingly, it has 
held in a case concerning the interception of telephone calls on business premises that the 
applicant ‘would have had a reasonable expectation of privacy for such calls.’63 
 
Granted the ECtHR highlights that an individual can, in certain circumstances, have a 
reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy. Indeed, the existence of such an expectation 
may sway the Strasbourg Court towards finding that Article 8(1) is engaged in a particular case. 
However, in the passage above, the ECtHR does not explicitly state that, absent the existence 
of a reasonably held expectation of privacy, Article 8(1) cannot be applicable. Furthermore, in 
cases pertaining to the retention and disclosure of criminal suspects’ personally identifiable 
information since Von Hannover, the applicant’s reasonable expectations of privacy are seldom 
mentioned and, where they are, the ECtHR seems to simply declare such expectations exist 
rather than use the reasonable expectation test as an empirically verifiable standard for the 
engagement of Article 8.64 In developing the normative content of Article 8, the ECtHR 
approach focuses on the degree to which a particular measure sets back the privacy related 
interests of the applicant, not on whether the individual can reasonably expect privacy in a 
                                           
61 n 21 above at [57]. 
62 D. Solove, Understanding Privacy (London: Harvard University Press, 2008) 73. 
63 n 12 above at [50]. 
64 Notably two leading cases considering the United Kingdom’s policies regarding the retention and dissemination 
of an individual’s personal information as part of a criminal process make no mention of the applicants’ reasonable 
expectations of privacy. See S v United Kingdom (2009) 48 EHRR 50; MM v United Kingdom ECtHR 13 Nov 
2012. 
particular situation, notwithstanding the fact that this may be one factor taken into 
consideration.65  
 
This is a sound approach. In focussing on identifying exactly how a measure interferes with 
the individual’s privacy interests and not reducing this enquiry to discussions of the context in 
which the measures are used and the reasonableness of any expectation of privacy, the ECtHR’s 
approach does not incorporate factors better considered as part of its Article 8(2) assessment. 
Lord Toulson acknowledged the Court’s need to be on guard against importing factors which 
should be considered as part of an analysis of the justification of the measures into the 
reasonable expectation of privacy test.66 However, this seems unavoidable when attempting to 
assess the applicability of Article 8(1) by focusing solely on the applicant’s reasonable 
expectations of privacy. For example, when distinguishing the facts in JR38 from Sciacca, Lord 
Toulson considered the fact that the applicant in JR38 was a member of a crowd engaged in a 
violent disturbance, and the police need to identify suspected offenders, to be the determinative 
considerations when assessing the extent to which the measures undertaken by the police 
interfered with the applicant’s Article 8(1) rights.67 One cannot expect to keep private - so the 
argument goes - activities of a criminal nature. This approach pre-empts the question of 
necessity in Article 8(2), as it focuses on the harm caused to society by the activity the applicant 
was involved in at the material time, and on countervailing societal interests such as identifying 
suspects in criminal investigations. These are factors which should properly be balanced 
against individual privacy interests and not factors that give an indication of the effect the 
measures taken by the police had on the applicant’s private life. This distinction is important: 
such factors unduly narrow the scope of the protection of the right when they are considered 
as part of the Article 8(1) analysis.  
 
Furthermore, to qualify reasonable expectations of privacy as determinative of whether Article 
8(1) is engaged neglects other important factors. Granted, if the applicant has wilfully 
disregarded his own privacy interests by engaging in criminal activities in public space this is 
a factor to be taken into consideration when assessing the impact the alleged interfering 
measures had on the applicant’s privacy interests, but this is not the sole or determinative factor. 
When one focuses on the impact the publication of the photographs might have on the life of 
the applicant it is clear this could seriously interfere with his privacy related interests. The 
applicant was a minor and was suspected of involvement in a public disturbance. Accordingly, 
the images formed part of a context, which disclosed to the public that the child was at least 
possibly involved in such activities.68 The purpose of this publication was to enable those who 
know or recognise him to contact the police and identify him. It is not difficult to envisage how 
the public disclosure of such images could have lasting consequences for the applicant’s 
capacity to make autonomous choices in different areas of his life.  
 
                                           
65 Not only is this approach well-documented in the case law of the ECtHR, a number of academic commentators 
have also observed the limited role the applicant’s reasonable expectations of privacy plays in determining an 
interference with Article 8(1): see S. Nouwt, B. Vries, and C. Prins (eds), Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: 
Eleven Country Reports on Camera Surveillance and Workplace Privacy (The Hague: Asser Press, 2005) 334-
335; P. De Hert, ‘Balancing Security and Liberty Within the European Human Rights Framework: A Critical 
Reading of the Court’s Case Law in the Light of Surveillance and Criminal Law Enforcement Strategies After 
9/11’ (2005) 1 Utrecht L Rev 68, 76; K. Hughes, ‘A Behavioural Understanding of Privacy and its Implications 
for Privacy Law’ (2012) 75 MLR 806, at 825. 
66 n 1 above at [88]. 
67 ibid at [93]. 
68 n 6 above at [30]. 
This much is acknowledged in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and in scholarly literature on 
the normative value of privacy.69 Not only is the disclosure of such information stigmatising, 
but when a criminal label is applied to a child (either through formal processes such as a 
criminal record or informal processes such as the sharing of knowledge of the individual’s 
criminal activities in the community) this can lead to difficulties in rehabilitation and 
precipitate further offending behaviour.70 It is for these reasons that specific provisions are 
made in international law to ensure the identity of a child is not revealed when they are subject 
to a criminal process.71 As Lord Kerr suggested, the notion that the publication of the 
applicant’s image does not fall within the scope of Article 8 and this is somehow in the best 
interests of the child is incongruous ‘and is distinctly out of step with the philosophy which 
underpins Article 3.1 of UNCRC [United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child].’72 
 
However, Lord Kerr did not discuss the relationship between different factors which might be 
considered relevant in determining whether Article 8(1) is engaged, or their relative 
importance. Thus, while Lord Toulson’s approach, which views the reasonable expectation of 
privacy standard as a ‘touchstone’ test of Article 8(1) engagement, overlooks important factors 
such as the age of the applicant, Lord Kerr’s approach offers little guidance in terms of how 
such factors might be balanced against one another. A third approach might involve focusing 
on whether or not a measure sets back the applicant’s privacy related interests to a reasonably 
significant degree.73 Such an approach takes a broad view of privacy interests, which 
recognises the fact that privacy interests are related to, yet distinct from, a broad range of other 
normative values and do not exist only where the individual holds a reasonable expectation that 
these interests will be respected.74 However, in incorporating a ‘reasonably significant’ test, 
the approach avoids an invidious system of over-regulation, which would result, if every 
possible set back to an individual’s privacy related interests could be held to engage Article 
8(1).75 This third approach does not involve balancing incommensurable factors such as the 
existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy, the age of the applicant, or the purpose of the 
interfering measure. Instead, the approach focuses on attributing a weight to the interference 
based on the degree to which the measure sets back the applicant’s privacy related interests. 
                                           
69 See, for example, J. Wagner DeCew, In Pursuit of Privacy: Law, Ethics, and the Rise of Technology (New 
York: Cornell University Press, 1997) 75-77; T. Nagel, ‘Concealment and Exposure’ (1998) n 42 above, 4; D. 
Solove, Understanding Privacy (London: Harvard University Press, 2008) 136-160; B. von Silva-Tarouca Larsen, 
Setting the Watch: Privacy and the Ethics of CCTV Surveillance (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) 16-29; A. 
Marmor, ‘What Is the Right to Privacy’ (2015) n 42 above. 
70 See generally: J. Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1989); P. Scraton and D. Haydon, ‘Challenging the Criminalization of Children and Young People’ in J. Muncie, 
G. Hughes and E. McLaughlin (eds), Youth Justice: Critical Readings (London: Sage, 2002) 311-329. 
71 Lord Kerr draws attention to Article 3.1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child which 
provides: ‘in all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, 
courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration.’ Furthermore, Rule 8 of the Beijing Rules, adopted by the General Assembly resolution 40/33 of 
29 November 1985, Provides: ‘8.1 The juvenile’s right to privacy shall be respected at all stages in order to avoid 
harm being caused to her or him by undue publicity or by the process of labeling. 8.2 In principle, no information 
that may lead to the identification of a juvenile offender shall be published.’ 
72 n 1 above at [50]. 
73 A similar approach has been advanced as a way of overcoming inconsistencies caused by the ‘reasonable 
expectation’ standard in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the United States: see D. Solove, ‘Fourth 
Amendment Pragmatism’ (2010) 51 BCL Rev 1511, 1514. 
74 See J. Reiman, ‘Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood’ (1976) 6 Philos Public Aff 26, 28. 
75 For example, when I am subject to a passing glance by another individual as I walk down a public street, my 
privacy related interests may be set back as I am subject to some form of scrutiny and deprived of control over 
who can look at me. However, it seems incongruous to suggest that any such setbacks are significant enough to 
warrant the protection of Article 8. 
Thus the approach allows for a full recognition of the impact of the interference on the 
individual’s private life, taking into account the range of ways different measures can set back 
privacy interests. This method also avoids importing factors that are better considered as part 
of an Article 8(2) analysis into the Article 8(1) assessment. It is from this point only that a fair 
balance can be struck between the privacy interests of the individual and the countervailing 
aims of the measure.  
 
In the immediate case, the majority does not dispute that the measures taken against the 
applicant could set back his privacy related interests. It is for this reason Lord Clarke posits 
that, if the photographs had been published for some reason other than identification, this might 
have engaged Article 8(1) because, for example, the applicant could reasonably expect that the 
police would not publish the photographs in an effort to maliciously shame him. However, the 
motivations for the publication are immaterial when considering the effect that the publication 
might have on the applicant’s privacy interests. Considered as part of the Article 8(1) (and not 
the Article 8(2)) analysis, such factors serve to dilute a full consideration of the effect the 
measures have on the applicant’s privacy related interests. The government should not be able 
to disseminate images of a child, taken as he occupies public space and is engaged in criminal 
activity, without any oversight. Such dissemination constitutes an interference with the child’s 
right to respect for private life as it has a reasonably significant disruptive effect on the 
applicant’s privacy related interests. Specifically, due to the potentially stigmatising effect this 
could have on the child in his local community, and any subsequent restrictions on the child’s 
personal autonomy, which may derive from this stigmatisation (for e.g. if such stigmatisation 
has an inhibiting effect on the rehabilitation of the child, this may have innumerable ‘knock-
on’ effects which could limit the range of social or economic opportunities available to the 
child in the future). It follows that such measures must only be used if they satisfy the 
requirements of Article 8(2). 
 
Lord Kerr offers a thorough and well-reasoned analysis of Article 8(2) in this case. The 
measures were ‘in accordance with the law’ and ‘in pursuit of a legitimate aim’. Both sides 
accepted that the measure pursued the legitimate aim of preventing disorder or crime. The 
images were also disclosed in compliance with the Data Protection Act 1998. Furthermore, the 
police devised a multi-agency policy directive aimed at identifying ‘at risk’ young people and 
diverting them away from offending behaviour. This policy directive is accessible to the public 
and contains a commitment to adhere to ECHR rights. Thus, the dissemination had a basis in 
domestic law, and was accessible to the applicant.76 Regarding the necessity of the interference, 
Lord Kerr first recognised the ways in which the measures set back the privacy related interests 
of the applicant. He also gave due weight not only to the considerable benefits to the 
community gained from identifying the perpetrators of a public riot, but also to the possible 
benefits the publication of the photographs could have for the applicant in the long term, 
through the intervention of appropriate criminal justice agencies. Accordingly, the interference 
struck a fair balance between the rights of the applicant and other competing interests. In this 
regard, it is noteworthy that the images were disseminated only to local news outlets for 
identification purposes, thus limiting the intrusion into the applicant’s private life to a minimal 
degree.77 
 
                                           
76 Kopp v Switzerland (1999) 27 EHRR 91 at [55]. 
77 On this point, the measures of dissemination in this case can be distinguished from the case of Peck v United 
Kingdom, where the applicant’s image was disseminated to national news outlets for the purposes of advertising 
the utility of CCTV surveillance. See n 52 above at [79]. 
 Conclusions 
 
Whilst it is not reasonable to expect that one can keep private one’s participation in a public 
riot, the measures taken to identify the applicant in JR38 evidently could set back his autonomy 
and privacy related interests in a number of ways. Taking into account the fact that the applicant 
was a child at the time of the incident, and he most likely could not have foreseen the 
subsequent publication of his image and the lasting consequences that this might have on his 
ability to manage his public reputation and lead an autonomous life, it seems proper that such 
measures should only be taken where there exist sufficient reasons to do so. The question 
whether such reasons exist falls to a consideration of the criteria set forth in Article 8(2) of the 
ECHR. The approach taken by the JR38 majority runs the risk of unduly restricting the scope 
of Article 8 to exclude situations where an individual’s privacy related interests are 
significantly set back as part of a criminal process. It is surprising that the Supreme Court has 
created a situation whereby the state is free to disseminate images of suspects in such situations 
without demonstrating a legitimate aim for the dissemination, and that such measures are 
necessary in pursuit of this aim. 
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